



The purpose of this chapter is to try to demystify the mainstream literature on
legal pluralism for foreign consultants or activists concerned with poverty reduction
in the global South. The chapter proceeds on the working assumption that such
interventions are legitimate, welcome, and well informed.
My standpoint is that of a British jurist interested in jurisprudence, legal anthro-
pology, “Law and Development,” and the implications of “globalization” for the
discipline and practice of law.1
The mainstream literature on legal pluralism draws on several disciplines and does
not belong to a single intellectual tradition. It is accordingly difficult to generalize
about it. However, I suggest that a high proportion of the anthropological and
sociolegal literature up to the mid-1990s approximates to a single ideal type, here
characterized as social fact legal pluralism (sflp). In the past fifteen years, the idea of
global legal pluralism (glp) has become fashionable, but I argue that this is in many
respects based on a qualitatively different lot of concerns and that, if there is a single
subject or field encompassed by this idea, it needs to be relabeled.
The mainstream literature contains a rich heritage of particular studies and some
rather less satisfactory theorizing. One of the problems is that it has been bedeviled
by an obsession with perennial jurisprudential problems surrounding the concept of
law and legal positivism. It has rather neglected other theoretical issues about both
pluralism and general normative theory. Part of the problem is that there is almost
systematic ambiguity with regard to some of the central concepts. Thus, we need to
start with some conceptual clarification.
1 My main relevant experience has been in East Africa: Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and to a
lesser extent Rwanda and Ethiopia, mainly in the period from 1958 to 1965 and in the mid-1990s. My
main relevant writings are Twining (2009a, 2009b, 2010). This chapter draws heavily on all of these.
I am grateful to the participants in the World Bank workshop on legal pluralism in April 2010, and
especially to Doug Porter and Brian Tamanaha for helpful comments.
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II. SOME BASIC CONCEPTS
Pluralism
Plural, usually contrasted with singular, means more than one and is applied to
persons or objects. It assumes that these units are discrete or individuated. The
primary meaning of pluralist is “the state of being plural.”2 Pluralistic can mean
diverse or varied. Pluralism is used as both a normative and a descriptive concept.
For example, in ethics, pluralism, typically contrasted with monism, refers to “[a]
theory or system of thought that recognizes more than one ultimate principle.”
Alternatively, belief pluralism refers to a situation in which different cosmologies or
belief systems coexist, a social fact of considerable significance in the current context
of “globalization,” not least in relation to claims about the universality of human
rights or natural law principles (Twining 2009a, 131 passim).
A related usage equates pluralism with multiculturalism. For example, Webster
gives as a second meaning of pluralist: “the nature of a society within which diverse
ethnic, social, and cultural interests exist and develop together” (Webster 1981).
However, in some contexts the term multiculturalism, contrasted with assimilation,
has been extended from referring to a social fact about a society to a normative
concept referring to strategies and policies in such a society directed at respecting
and maintaining cultural diversity in various ways.3
Here it is worth noting three points. First, to talk of objects in the plural presupposes
that they can be individuated. Second, there is a general tendency in some contexts
to move from an empirical to a normative usage, as illustrated by the two primary
usages of multiculturalism. Third, it is always important to ask: plurality of what
precisely?
Individuation
Plural means more than one. This presupposes that one can identify some discrete
objects or units. In jurisprudence there has been much discussion of questions such
as: What counts as one law or rule? What is a complete rule (Raz 1980)? There
is widespread agreement among jurists that nearly all rules, norms, or laws belong
to some larger agglomeration such as a system, order, or code. This is helpful,
but it merely pushes the problem of individuation to a more abstract level. For
2 There are certain special applications that we can set on one side: for example, “a pluralist” can refer
to “one who holds two or more offices, especially ecclesiastical benefices, at the same time” (Webster
1981). The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) suggests that this was the original usage and that other
meanings are extensions. The OED recognizes a special meaning of “pluralism” in ontology as “the
theory that the knowable world is made up of a plurality of interacting things.”
3 More directly related to legal pluralism is the special meaning of “pluralism” in political science,
rendered by the OED as “[a] theory which opposes monolithic state power and advocates instead
increased devolution and autonomy for the main organizations that represent man’s involvement in
society.”
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example, legal pluralism is often taken to refer to the coexistence of two or more
legal orders in the same time-space context. But what constitutes an order can
be very vague; not all normative and legal orders have precise boundaries; and
there are plenty of warnings in the literature about the dangers of “reifying” or
“essentializing” such units or treating them as more homogeneous or monolithic
than they really are.4 The same applies to concepts such as culture and community.
Talk of “pluralism” presupposes individuation. We need concepts such as order,
system, code, community, and culture, and we talk about them as if they are discrete
units (Twining 2009a, chap. 15). But we also need to be aware of the pitfalls.
Normative Pluralism5
We all encounter normative pluralism every day of our lives. When I ask my students
to list all the sets of norms that they have encountered in the past week, very few do not
get to a hundred. We accept this situation as a social fact; we navigate these complex-
ities daily without undue difficulty, and we rarely puzzle about the phenomenon.
Despite this, many lawyers are puzzled about “legal pluralism”; some even deny the
concept, and there has been much theoretical debate about it. There has been much
less theorizing about normative pluralism, which raises some profound philosophical
problems in the general theory of norms (Twining 2010, 479–85).
Non-state law. How to conceptualize law is a central problem of jurisprudence.
Although still contested, it is increasingly accepted that a conception of law confined
to state law (or to municipal law and classical public international law) leaves out
too many significant phenomena deserving sustained juristic attention, including
religious law, customary law, and certain other kinds of transnational and suprana-
tional normative orders. Nearly all studies of legal pluralism assume or assert some
conception of non-state law. This is presupposed by the very idea of legal pluralism
and opposed by one version of state-centrism – namely, that state law is the only real
law. Accepting the idea of non-state law leads almost inevitably to the view that legal
pluralism is an important, pervasive, and complex phenomenon. How to distinguish
between “legal” and other social phenomena has been an almost obsessive concern
of lp studies. In my view, this concern has been largely unnecessary, because in most
contexts not much turns on where, or even whether, the line is drawn.
Legal pluralism. I have for many years found it helpful to treat legal pluralism as a
species of normative pluralism. If normative pluralism refers to a situation in which
different sets of norms or two or more institutionalized normative orders coexist in the
4 An extreme example of the dangers is the creation of the categories of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, which
reportedly contributed significantly to the genocide of 1994 (e.g., Prunier 1995). Recent literature
on religious minorities in Europe repeatedly warns against ignoring internal diversity within such
“communities” or “groups” (e.g., Bano 2007).
5 In this context, normative pluralism refers to the existence of a plurality of norms (i.e., rules or
prescriptions) or of normative orders as a social fact. This is narrower than the ordinary usage of
normative, contrasted with empirical, meaning evaluative or prescriptive.
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same time-space context, then legal pluralism is the species that includes those kinds
of sets of norms or normative orders that merit the appellation legal in a given context
(Twining 2009a, chap. 4).6 This move does not solve the problem of the definitional
stop – how to have a broad concept of law without including all social phenomena –
but it domesticates the problem in a number of ways. First, it decenters the state (on
which more is discussed in the next part). Second, it raises the issue of how to classify
normative phenomena: normative theory tells us that depends on context and the
purpose of the inquiry (Twining 2010). Third, it brings out the point that in many
contexts, the scheme of classification and which borderline cases are subsumed or
excluded from “the legal” are of little or no practical importance. I argue later that in
the present context the main relevant point is that law reformers, policy makers, and
importers of foreign laws and ideas need to be aware of the existence and nature of
significant normative orders, whether or not they are recognized locally to be “legal”
or to have some theoretical claim to that status. Of course, whether a particular order
or set of norms is recognized by the state as “legal” or legally relevant occasionally may
have practical consequences, but such issues are nearly always resolved in specific
contexts.
Recently, several scholars of legal pluralism have moved toward treating legal
pluralism as a species of normative pluralism or abandoning the term altogether.
They have made this move for different reasons. Simon Roberts has written “against
legal pluralism” mainly because he thinks that talk of legal pluralism obscures the
distinctiveness of state law and governance as specific forms (Roberts 1998, 2005).7
John Griffiths is prepared to drop the concept of law as part of constructing a general
theory of social norms (Griffiths 2003, 2006). Brian Tamanaha (2008), alternatively,
sees this move as a way of rescuing “legal pluralism” as a worthwhile field of inquiry
or focus of attention. Like me, he thinks this will help shift attention away from the
debilitating problems of conceptualizing law. The move does not solve the problem
but contextualizes the concern and makes it less important.
State Centralism (or Centrism)
In 1986, John Griffiths launched a sharp attack on legal centralism, which he treated
as an “ideology” (Griffiths 1986, 3). In this view, “law is and should be the law of
the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a
6 On the need in this context to work with two conceptions of law (law as ideas – as in legal traditions –
and law as institutionalized normative orders or practices) and the conceptual framework this entails,
see Twining (2009a, chaps. 1, 3, and 4). This chapter concentrates on social fact legal pluralism (sflp)
that treats institutionalized normative orders (and to a lesser extent sets of norms) as the main units;
another strand, following in the footsteps of Geertz, treats cultures (and related concepts) as the main
units (see Sally Merry’s chapter this volume).
7 Discussed in Twining (2009a, 371–75). In my view, most of Roberts’s concerns can be met by using
terms such as state law or municipal law instead of law and not making law do too much work as an
analytical concept.
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single set of state institutions.” This ideology is a mixture of assertions about how
the world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how the world actually and
even necessarily is. In Griffiths’s view, legal centralism was “the major obstacle to
the development of a descriptive theory of law” (1986, 3).
Attacks on “legal centralism” and “state centralism” have continued, but the
grounds have been diverse. In light of subsequent discussions, the idea of state
centralism needs to be disaggregated into a series of distinct but related propositions
of different kinds:
(a) At the level of description, the state is the only institution that contributes to
social order.
(b) The empirical claim that, at least in modern societies, state law is in practice
the most important form of law: it is dominant, technically superior, and more
powerful than other forms of institutionalized ordering (e.g., Galligan 2007,
chap. 10).
(c) The normative claim that the state has sole and supreme authority in a given
territory or space, and it has a monopoly of the legitimate use of force.
(d) The ideological claim that the state is the political form that offers the best or
only hope for the realization of liberal democratic values, such as democracy,
equality, human rights, and the rule of law.
Most people who have thought about it would contest (a) as an empirical state-
ment about nearly all societies. Conversely, asserting that legal pluralism is a social
fact involves no general claims about the de facto importance, technical sophisti-
cation, and power of modern bureaucratic states (b). Such claims are difficult to
test empirically. The issue is central to discussions about the decline of the state,
not least in the context of globalization, but inquiries about its relative power and
importance are extraordinarily elusive. (c) and (d) are both generally contested in
political theory.
The idea of legal pluralism, and the importance of the phenomenon, are widely
recognized in recent scholarly literature. Legal pluralism mainly challenges (a).
However, it would be wrong to assume that state-centrism is dead.8 Most Western
academic law and legal practice is focused almost entirely on domestic municipal
law of sovereign states and is likely to remain so.9 Even in circles in which the idea
8 An interesting example of a moderate form of state-centrism is provided by the leading sociolegal
scholar, Denis Galligan: he recognizes that there are forms of non-state law that coexist and intersect
with state legal orders; he acknowledges that many claims made for the state’s social role are extravagant,
that it can be ineffective or worse, and that non-state normative orders, whether recognized as legal or
not, often have social utility. However, he concludes that the modern democratic state provides the
best hope for achieving some social goods, including human rights, the rule of law, and democracy
(Galligan 2007, chap. 10). In respect of the subordination of non-state law, he recognizes that there
can be semi-independence or semiautonomy but denies claims to complete autonomy (2007, 176–
77).
9 Underlying most regimes of legal education and training is a concern about the practical relevance of
what is being studied. The maxim “lawyers don’t practice non-state law” is sometimes true. It is also
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139094597.011
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UCL, Institute of Education, on 11 Mar 2019 at 14:41:55, subject to the Cambridge Core
Legal Pluralism 101 117
of legal pluralism is accepted, a milder form of state centralism prevails. In much of
the literature, the focus is still largely on the interactions between state and non-state
law: how the state does and should respond, where it should hold the line, how
minority communities should adjust, and how they can make their voices heard
in policy formation. Typically, foreign development agencies and consultants have
to work through governments with the result that, even if they are sensitive to the
phenomenon of legal pluralism, it is difficult for them to avoid being state-centric
in this weaker sense.
There are also fundamental ideological questions about the desirability of many
forms of legal pluralism. This raises a range of both normative and empirical issues
that extend far beyond the topic of “legal pluralism.” Some of these issues concern
broad questions of general political theory about the role of the state, its claims to
a monopoly of legitimate force, and claims to independence or autonomy by or on
behalf of non-state legal orders. Some believe that the bureaucratic state offers the
best, perhaps the only, hope for maintaining democracy, human rights, and the rule
of law. These are important and complex political issues with wide ramifications.
Sociolegal research on legal pluralism can inform debates about them, as it has done
recently with regard to ethnic and religious minorities in Europe,10 but on its own
it cannot purport to resolve such fundamental issues of political and democratic
theory. In this context, it is important to remember Boaventura Santos’s admonition
against romanticizing legal pluralism, as some scholars have tended to do: “[T]here is
nothing inherently good, progressive or emancipatory about legal pluralism” (Santos
1995, 114–15).
In development circles, especially at higher levels, state-centrism may be due
to ignorance, deliberate policy, indifference, or downright hostility. A strong, but
not untypical, example of hostility to customary law is a speech in 2006 by the
secretary-general of the Commonwealth Secretariat:11
The drawbacks of customary law are manifold. For a start, just take its perceived
failure to adapt to the expectations created by modern statehood, education, new
technology, and global development. It lacks a contemporary comprehensiveness.
It fails to address the emerging issues and needs of children, women and the
disadvantaged. (McKinnon 2006, 651)
self-confirming, but it is being eroded in multicultural societies and, for example, in international
arbitration.
10 For example, Shah and Menski (2006), Bano (2007).
11 The Rt. Hon. Don McKinnon was addressing a legal conference on “Courting Justice: Rule of Law
Reform in Africa” in London in April 2006. After listing a series of “deep-seated and harmful social
values and practices” (including female genital mutilation, enforced female servitude, prolonged
mourning rites, and so forth), he concluded: “From these examples, it is clear that the greatest single
damage done by the persistence of customary law is to women, children and the poor. How far this
has been a bar to our achievement of the Millennium Development Goals – particularly the 2nd to
achieve universal primary education; the 3rd, to promote gender equality and empower women; and
the 5th, to promote maternal health – remains a matter for concern” (McKinnon 2006, 651).
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A significant example of indifference, bordering on hostility, is that of Jeffrey Sachs,
the director of the Millennium Project. His powerful book The End of Poverty does
not mention customary law or religion, but tellingly has a significant heading in the
index for “cultural barriers” (Sachs 2005, index).12 This is not atypical of writing about
development by economists, though there are some exceptions. Not all discussions
of customary law, culture, and tradition are so sweeping. Frontline development
practitioners may be more sensitive to local complexities. There is, of course, a
body of literature, much of it based on detailed empirical research, that presents a
more complex and balanced view.13 This kind of negativity, illustrated by McKinnon
and Sachs, tends to be based on a number of dubious assumptions: that women are
always at a disadvantage under customary law, that customary law is static rather than
dynamic, that it is rigid rather than flexible, that it is incompatible with sustainable
development, that it is always economically inefficient, that it is not concerned to
conserve resources, and that values involved in economic development strategies
(including the Millennium Development Goals) are intrinsically morally superior
to customary values.14
“Coexistence in the same time-space context” refers to phenomena that in princi-
ple can be studied empirically, for example, human behavior, attitudes, institutions,
processes, even beliefs. This fits law conceived in terms of social practices, institu-
tions, and processes. But law is also conceived in terms of concepts, norms, traditions,
and cultures independently of their institutionalization on the ground (and which
may never have been so institutionalized, or about which we have no data).15 The
idea of “coexistence” in time and space in relation to these is problematic. Where is
justice? Where are rights? are puzzling questions. As Franz von Benda-Beckmann
(2002) suggests, whether we can make sense of the idea of coexistence depends on
the context and purpose of the inquiry (cf. Walker 2009).
Interlegality. Santos’s useful concept refers to relations and interactions between
legal orders and sets of norms. Interlegality is best viewed as a dynamic process rather
12 The longest passage reads: “Even when governments are trying to advance their countries, the cultural
environment may be an obstacle to development. Cultural or religious norms in the society may
block the role of women, for example, leaving half of the population without economic or political
rights and without education, thereby undermining half of the population in its contribution to
overall development. Denying women their rights and education results in cascading problems. Most
important, perhaps, the demographic transition from high fertility to low fertility is delayed or blocked
altogether” (Sachs 2005, 60–61; see also 36–37, 72).
13 For example, O¨rebach et al. (2005). A central theme of the book is: “[E]ach customary law system
needs to be evaluated on its merits” (Bosselman, id. at p. 441). See also Perreau-Saussine and Murphy
(2007) and Rajagopal (2007, 276–82).
14 Counterexamples to most of these overgeneralizations can be found in O¨rebech et al. (2005). On
“chthonic law” and the environment, see Glenn (2007, 72–76). Because generalized hostility to
customary law tends to be ignorantly ethnocentric, it does not follow that there are no problems
(discussed in Twining 2009a, 11.6 [“Non-state law; the forgotten factor”]).
15 For example, there is a rich, largely unempirical literature about Shari’a as ideas, but relatively few
empirical studies of Muslim institutionalized social/legal practices.
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than in terms of static structures. It is an empirical concept that draws attention to
the dynamism and diversity of such relations, but it is generally acknowledged that
interlegality does not necessarily involve conflict or competition. How normative and
legal orders interact and interrelate is an empirical and interpretive question covering
a range of possibilities, including symbiosis, subsumption, imitation, convergence,
adaptation, partial integration, and avoidance as well as subordination, repression,
or destruction.16 Any attempt to classify these elusive relations in the abstract is likely
to fail.
Recognition17
The idea of recognition (of states, foreign laws, and so forth) has a long history in
public and private international law. In legal pluralism studies, the term mainly
arises in connection with the relationship between the state and non-state legal
orders. There are no consistent uses of the term. In this context, it is important to
distinguish between a state according recognition and communities, groups, or even
individuals claiming, demanding, or asking for recognition by the state. These are
not coextensive and have different variants. For example, a state may acknowledge
the existence of a non-state order without giving it any legal status, or it may or may
not take into account the existence of norms or practices in the exercise of judicial or
administrative discretion – for example, in sentencing or provocation, or in framing
specific policies or legislation. It may undertake to enforce such norms; it may
incorporate some as part of the official legal system, with or without modification,
or subject to certain conditions or limitations. It may integrate to a greater or lesser
degree certain institutions, practices, or tribunals into the state legal system.18 It
may defer to private ordering, as with certain kinds of arbitration or other forms of
self-regulation, or it can outlaw certain practices, thereby acknowledging that they
exist, and so forth.
In considering demands or claims for recognition, it is important to clarify what
precisely is being asked for. It is also important to realize that (a) what the state
accords or imposes may not be what a given group wants and that (b) such demands
or claims may be contested within a given population. For example, in the debate
in Britain following the archbishop of Canterbury’s speech advocating recognition
of some decisions of Islamic Councils with respect to family law, there was not only
a (largely Islamophobic) outcry against this suggestion, but British Muslims were
16 Tamanaha (2008) emphasizes conflict as being the most problematic aspect but recognizes that there
are other kinds of relations between normative orders; I am inclined to use the concept of interlegality
as an open-ended concept that refers to all kinds of relations – what these are in any given context is
an empirical and interpretative question.
17 This section is indebted to Ghai and Cottrell (2009).
18 For example, on the Basoga in Uganda in the colonial period, see Fallers (1969).
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split on the issues (Bano 2007, 2010). There is no agreed terminology with respect to
recognition, but there is widespread agreement that it is a highly political matter.
This sample of problematic concepts could be extended to include several oth-
ers that have been extensively discussed in other contexts, including religion (and
religious law), custom (and customary law), tradition, culture, and authority.
II. SOCIAL FACT LEGAL PLURALISM
Social Fact Conceptions of Legal Pluralism: An Ideal Type
The mainstream legal pluralism literature has quite diverse intellectual roots. Gen-
eralization is dangerous, except that the very idea of legal pluralism typically pre-
supposes a conception of non-state law. However, one can construct a fairly robust
ideal type of social fact (legal) pluralism (sflp) to which most anthropological and
sociolegal studies up to the mid-1990s approximated, based on the following points:
1. If one adopts a broad, positivist conception of law, legal pluralism is as much
a social fact as normative pluralism.19
2. It is important to distinguish between state legal pluralism (sometimes called
weak legal pluralism), legal polycentricity (the eclectic use of sources within
different sectors of one state legal system) (Petersen and Zahle 1995), and
legal pluralism conceived as the coexistence of two or more autonomous or
semiautonomous legal orders or sets of norms in the same time-space context.20
3. Legal pluralism is pervasive in all multicultural societies, which in today’s
world means most societies.
4. Legal pluralism is not new. Indeed, from the perspective of world history,
the near monopoly of coercive power by a centralized bureaucratic state is a
modern exception, largely confined to the Northern Hemisphere for less than
two hundred years.
19 Accordingly, it is quite misleading to talk of “legal pluralists” as a marginal school or sect or a particular
theoretical perspective (Benda-Beckmann 2002, 72–74). This is one of the best general articles on legal
pluralism, and I am in general agreement with its thrust.
20 Twining (2010) uses a series of case studies to illustrate some standard distinctions in sflp: ordinary
statutory interpretation, not interpreted as “pluralism”: Sudan Govt. El Baleila Balla Baleila (1958)
Sudan Law Journal and Reports 12 (interpretation of the Sudan Penal Code invoking English concept
of “the reasonable man” and Baggara values relating to cattle in relation to provocation in homicide);
state (“weak”) legal pluralism: the S. M. Otieno burial case (Kenya) (Egan 1987) (customary law as an
integral part of state law); “genuine” legal pluralism: Santos’s Pasagarda Residents’ Association (Brazil)
(Santos 1995, 2002), the Common Law Movement (United States) (Koniak 1996, 1997); Romani law
(transnational) (Weyrauch and Bell, 1993; Weyrauch 1997); pluralism of discourse: Bowen’s studies in
Indonesia where argumentation in state, Islamic, and customary tribunals regularly involves weaving
together state, Islamic, and traditional norms and concepts (Bowen 2003). Some of these distinctions
are now challenged in the context of globalization (Michaels 2009).
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5. Legal pluralism is here to stay. Custom and tradition may be more dynamic
and flexible than these labels suggest, but insofar as institutionalized normative
orders are grounded in settled ways and beliefs and a sense of identity, they
are intransigent and resistant to change from the outside. For aspiring “social
engineers” who perceive them as obstacles, they are more like mountains than
molehills.
6. From the standpoint of subjects, users, and victims, situations of legal pluralism
sometimes, but not always, provide opportunities for “shopping” for advice,
norms, or fora.
7. Acknowledging legal pluralism as a social fact involves no necessary commit-
ment to any of the following propositions:
a. State law is unimportant.
b. The state is withering away.
c. Acceptance of legal pluralism as a fact involves a denial or weakening of
such ideals as liberal democracy, human rights; and the rule of law.
8. It is a distortion to think of interlegality – relations and interactions between
coexisting legal orders – as typically entailing conflict and competition.
9. Sflp studies were empirically oriented and focused mainly on institutionalized
normative orders, as opposed to state centrism. It was generally not much
concerned with normative questions about legitimacy, authority, justification,
obligatoriness, and official policies toward non-state normative orders and laws.
Normativity
We have noted in relation to the concept of pluralism that there is a tendency in
the literature to slide from the descriptive to the prescriptive. But sflp studies tell us
almost nothing about the internal or external legitimacy, obligatoriness, or legality of
non-state legal orders. Their existence as a social fact, their nature, and their internal
and external relations have been their main concern. But questions arise at all levels
of legal ordering about how coexisting orders should view each other.
In recent years, legal philosophers have devoted a great deal of attention to the topic
of “the normativity of law.” The central question is whether (state) law is by its nature
obligatory, binding, and authoritative or whether obligations to obey, observe, and
respect the law are based on contingencies external to the law itself.21 Three aspects
of this trend stand in sharp contrast to the mainstream literature on legal pluralism:
first, the focus is on the domestic law of a given society; second, the idea of law is
confined to state law; and, third, the standpoint is that of participants in or subjects
21 For example, in a stimulating book, Sylvie Delacroix argues that laws are human creations that
are obligatory for judges, lawmakers, and citizens “if law is deemed to promote a set of moral and
prudential concerns essential to a ‘good’ way of living together” (Delacroix 2006, xiv, 206). In other
words, the normative force of law is itself a creation of the moral aspirations and sense of responsibility
of its subjects as members of a community. See also Simmonds (2009).
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of that legal system. The question for them is: what is my responsibility toward
my/our legal system? This differs from sflp, which (typically) (a) is not confined to
nation-states, countries, or societies conceived of as units; (b) extends the concept of
law to include at least some kinds of non-state law; and (c) adopts the standpoint of
an observer of legal orders who is external to them but takes account of the internal
point of view of citizens, lawmakers, judges, and other participants.
Such differences look like a rerun of juristic debates between positivists and non-
positivists resurfacing in the context of discussions of legal pluralism. However, the
situation is more complicated than that for two main reasons: First, some supporters
of the idea of legal pluralism are non-positivists.22 Second, many writers about
legal pluralism have normative concerns, both at the level of ideology (opposing
“state-centrism”) and in relation to practical problems facing policy makers, judges,
legislators, and other participants in legal processes. However, as just noted, most
classical social fact accounts of legal pluralism, like legal positivism, provide little or
no guidance on normative issues, other than suggesting that the phenomena are too
empirically important to be ignored.
III. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM – A NEW “PARADIGM”?
A radically ambiguous idea introduced largely in response to “globalization” – that
is, since the mid-1990s – is that of global legal pluralism (glp). Each of its ele-
ments is problematic. We have already noted the ambiguities of “pluralism” and
“legal.” “Global” is almost as ambiguous and is currently overused and misused
(Twining 2009a, chap. 1.4). It can mean (a) genuinely worldwide, (b) widespread
geographically, (c) anything transnational or supranational, or (d) anything related
to increased interdependence.23 A crucial point is that most so-called global legal
phenomena and patterns are sub-global, related to empires, diasporas, alliances,
trading blocs, languages, and legal traditions. But “g-talk” is prone to exaggera-
tion and hyperbole.24 For example, there is a tendency in anglophone discussions
22 An interesting example of the first group is Emmanuel Melissaris (2009), who constructs a sustained
argument that ideas of legal pluralism and non-state law can be accommodated within nonpositivist
legal theory on the basis of people’s shared experiences and sense of law that are to some degree
universal. Philip Selznick is perhaps the most substantial sociolegal theorist who seeks to transcend
the is/ought divide. His concepts of incipient law and responsive law may be of particular rele-
vance to development activists confronting non-state law (Kagan, Krygier, and Winston 2002; Krygier,
forthcoming).
23 For example, see the attitude of Rene´ David to custom as symptomatic of French attitudes (discussed
in Twining 2010).
24 The oversimplification of loose “g-talk” is illustrated by the claim that “English is the global language.”
That English is important and powerful in many countries and contexts is undeniably true. But how
many people count as “English speakers,” and how are they distributed? In about seventy countries,
English is the official or dominant language, but in many of these only a small percentage of the
population have it as their first or second language or have a working knowledge of it. For example, in
“Anglophone” Uganda, the best, but purely speculative, estimate was that in 1994 perhaps 11 percent of
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of legal pluralism and “law and development” to extrapolate from the practices
and hangovers of the British Empire (itself a sub-global phenomenon) to gen-
eralize about the whole postcolonial situation. Anglo-American discourse in this
area often understates the differences between the practices, attitudes, and postin-
dependence legacies of different traditions of imperialism and colonialism – for
example, in relation to conscious policies of indirect rule or attitudes to customary
law.25
Despite the confused terminology, the concerns are real, but the answers to the
question “plurality of what?” are different from those of sflp: for example, frag-
mentation of public international law, multiple geographical levels of ordering,26
proliferation of supranational tribunals and of significant legal actors, proliferation
of human rights, and so forth. Associating glp with “postmodernism” – itself an
ambiguous concept – further muddies the waters. A major question is: is glp an
extension of lp or sflp or a new “paradigm” (Michaels 2009, 243–44)? My view is
skeptical. Pluralism may not be a good focus or label for these concerns, many of
which are normative – relating to institutional design, state and supra-state policy,
rights-based approaches to development, and so forth.27
“Globalization” is challenging some of the settled assumptions of Western tra-
ditions of academic law.28 Legal pluralism studies, especially sflp, are perhaps less
wedded to some of these assumptions: they oppose state centrism, they accept some
idea of “non-state law,” they take religion seriously, and they have more of an empir-
ical orientation than doctrinal legal studies.29
However, several factors challenge any strong claims to continuity.
First, sflp grew out of a tradition that focused largely on small, face-to-face local
communities at a subnational level; the range of subject matters and actors was a far
cry from questions about international terrorism, the fragmentation of international
the population claimed English as their second language. That is to say that almost 90 percent of the
population could not understand the language of the laws, courts (including magistrates’ courts), or
most official business (Crystal 1995). On the complexities of assessing such claims, see Crystal (2003).
25 I have argued elsewhere that law and development is an American term, adopted in due course by some
British scholars, but virtually unknown in the discourse of French, Dutch, and Portuguese colonial
and postcolonial literature (Twining 2009a, 327, 330–31). Almost all of the papers in this volume are
by anglophone scholars, and in some papers one can detect an American bias toward emphasis on
pathological aspects of law – disputes, litigation, courts, and cases – in contrast to codes, principles,
structures, and routines. Lauren Benton has plausibly suggested that different colonial strategies may
mask more common patterns and problems than appear on the surface.
26 See Appendix B.
27 Of course, a multiplicity of normative and legal orders can be perceived at transnational, regional, and
global levels; they interact with each other horizontally, vertically, and in more complex ways; they
are as much a social fact worthy of attention as legal and normative pluralism at national and more
local levels. But this is only one facet of the variety of phenomena that tend to get lumped together
under “glp.”
28 See Appendix A.
29 This is developed in Twining (2010).
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law, regulation of transnational finance and commerce, regional integration, and
trafficking of drugs or humans.
Second, sflp was mainly concerned with plurality of coexisting institutionalized
normative orders. So-called global legal pluralism gives a much more varied answer
to the question: plurality of what? Here, the term pluralism has been applied indis-
criminately to almost any kind of complexity or diversity. Moving the central legacy
of insights onto a world stage involves significant changes in scale, subject mat-
ters, and central concerns. The idea of glp applied to actors, courts, schools of
thought, centers of power, sources of norms, levels of relations and ordering, author-
ity, culture, or even the proliferation of human rights means little more than diver-
sity. Postmodern enthusiasm for fragmentation, diversification, and indeterminacy
further threatens to reduce the value of “pluralism” as an analytic concept. We
are swamped with a not very illuminating plurality of pluralisms. It is not clear
how helpful the heritage of sflp studies can be in interpreting these very varied
topics.
Third, and equally significant, insofar as sflp studies have been largely descriptive
rather than normative, one should not expect much practical normative guidance
about such issues as institutional design, state policy, or rights-based approaches to
development.
Fourth, as borders become more porous and state sovereignty is challenged, are
sharp distinctions between the internal and external aspects of state legal systems still
tenable? From a global perspective, state (weak) legal pluralism, conflicts of laws,
and the politics of recognition transcend distinctions between state and non-state
law (Michaels 2009).
Fifth, mainstream lp studies have bequeathed us a rich heritage of particular
studies and a rather less impressive body of theorizing. Moving the central legacy
of insights onto a world stage involves significant changes in scale, subject matters,
and central concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
From the point of view of development practitioners, the central lesson of sflp is
that local knowledge is important. The phenomena of legal pluralism are so varied
and complex that a general World Bank strategy toward non-state legal orders would
almost certainly be unwise, even dangerous. Douglas Porter, in commenting on this
chapter, suggested that many frontline development practitioners are well aware of
the existence and intransigence of plural normative orders and bodies of rules. They
realize that they are ubiquitous, elusive, likely to persist, and difficult to change.
What they want is guidance on how to deal with such situations. From that point of
view, this chapter is rather negative in that it suggests that the literature of sflp can
be used to back up such perceptions, but it does not provide much general guidance
beyond the following, rather anodyne conclusions.
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Sflp literature, by emphasizing the fact of the coexistence of significant institu-
tionalized bodies of social norms and practices, is helpful in at least five ways:
(a) in drawing attention to the existence of non-state orders, practices, and norms
that are often ignored, overlooked, arcane, or even invisible;
(b) in the context of diffusion/transplantation, it provides a reminder that norms
based on foreign models are rarely introduced into a vacuum (the blank slate
fallacy) but will inevitably have to interact with preexisting local arrangements,
which will often include significant institutionalized normative orders;
(c) it warns that many claims to convergence, harmonization, or unification may
refer mainly or only to surface law (Twining 2009a, chap. 10);
(d) it focuses attention on interlegality – the many different and complex ways
in which multiple legal and normative orders can relate to one another and
interact; and
(e) it focuses attention on issues of state policy concerning relations between the
state and different communities and belief systems in a multicultural society.
But insofar as one adopts a social fact view of normative pluralism, this will on
its own provide little direct guidance on normative questions about legitimacy,
justification, toleration, and recognition of non-state legal orders.
APPENDIX
A. Western Traditions of Academic Law: Some Simplistic Assumptions30
(a) law consists of two principal kinds of ordering: municipal state law and public
international law (classically conceived as ordering the relations between
states) (“the Westphalian duo”);
(b) nation-states, societies, and legal systems are very largely closed, self-contained
entities that can be studied in isolation;
(c) modern law and modern jurisprudence are secular, now largely independent
of their historical-cultural roots in the Judeo-Christian traditions;
(d) modern state law is primarily rational-bureaucratic and instrumental, perform-
ing certain functions and serving as a means for achieving particular social
ends;
(e) law is best understood through “top-down” perspectives of rulers, officials,
legislators, and elites, with the points of view of users, consumers, victims, and
other subjects being at best marginal;
(f) the main subject matters of the discipline of law are ideas and norms rather
than the empirical study of social facts;
30 Adapted from Twining (2009a, 5–7).
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(g) modern state law is almost exclusively a Northern (European/Anglo-
American) creation, diffused through most of the world via colonialism, impe-
rialism, trade, and latter-day postcolonial influences;
(h) the study of non-Western legal traditions is a marginal and unimportant part
of Western academic law; and
(i) the fundamental values underlying modern law are universal, although the
philosophical foundations are diverse.
B. Levels of Law31
Law is concerned with relations between subjects or persons (human, legal, unin-
corporated, and otherwise) at a variety of levels, not just with relations within a
single nation-state or society. One way of characterizing such levels is essentially
geographical:
 global (as with some environmental issues, a possible ius humanitatis and,
by extension, intergalactic or space law) – for example, mineral rights on the
moon;
 international (in the classic sense of relations between sovereign states and,
more broadly, relations governed, for example, by human rights or refugee
law);
 regional (for example, the European Union, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and the African Union);
 transnational (for example, Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, and Romani [“gypsy”] law;
transnational arbitration; a putative lex mercatoria; Internet law; and, more con-
troversially, the internal governance of multinational corporations; the Catholic
Church; or institutions of organized crime);
 intercommunal (as in relations between religious communities, Christian
churches, or different ethnic groups);
 territorial state (including the legal systems of nation-states, and subnational
jurisdictions, such as Florida, Greenland, Quebec, and Northern Ireland);
 sub-state (e.g., subordinate legislation, such as bylaws of the borough of Cam-
den) or religious law officially recognized for limited purposes in a plural legal
system; and
 non-state (including laws of subordinated peoples, such as native North Amer-
icans, Maoris, or gypsies or illegal legal orders, such as Santos’s Pasagarda law,
the Southern People’s Liberation Army’s legal regime in Southern Sudan,32
and the “common law movement” of militias in the United States). Which of
31 Adapted from Twining (2009a, 69–74).
32 The Southern Peoples’ Liberation Army operated a system of courts dealing with both civil and
criminal cases in areas they occupied in the civil war in the southern Sudan (Kuol 1997).
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these should be classified as “law” or “legal” is essentially contested within legal
theory and also depends on the context and purposes of the discourse.
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